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Abstract
Most empirical and theoretical econometric studies of dynamic discrete choice models as-
sume the discount factor to be known. We show the knowledge of the discount factor is not
necessary to identify parts, or all, of the payo¤ function. We show the discount factor can be
generically identied jointly with the payo¤ parameters. It is known the payo¤ function cannot
nonparametrically identied without any a priori restrictions. Our identication of the discount
factor is robust to any normalization choice on the payo¤ parameters. In IO applications nor-
malizations are usually made on switching costs, such as entry costs and scrap values. We also
show that switching costs can be nonparametrically identied, in closed-form, independently
of the discount factor and other parts of the payo¤ function. Our identication strategies are
constructive. They lead to easy to compute estimands that are global solutions. We illustrate
with a Monte Carlo study and the dataset from Ryan (2012).
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1 Introduction
The stationary dynamic discrete decision model surveyed in Rust (1994) has been a subject of much
research in econometric theory and empirical studies. The primitives of the model consist of the
period payo¤ function, Markov transition law, and discount factor. A well-known characteristic of
a dynamic decision model is that it is not identied. For example, Manski (1983) points out in
general that the discount factor and payo¤ function cannot be jointly identied nonparametrically.
Most positive identication results in the literature until recently focus on identifying payo¤ para-
meters while assuming other primitives to be known; e.g. see Magnac and Thesmar (2002), and also
Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008) and Bajari et al. (2009). Meanwhile an empirical work
typically parameterizes the payo¤ function, parameterizes at least part of the distribution of the
variables, and assumes the discount factor to be known.
In this paper we are interested in identifying the discount factor jointly with the payo¤ func-
tion under the linear-in-parameter specication. This parametric model is the most commonly used
specication in practice. When there are nite states the linear specication can represent any non-
parametric function. Most empirical studies assume the value of the discount factor to be known
without any formal justication. To the best of our knowledge we are not aware of any prior iden-
tication study involving the discount factor in a general parametric model. We provide conditions
under which both the discount factor and payo¤parameters can be identied, and propose an easy to
compute estimator for them. Other positive identication of the discount factor in the literature use
a nonparametric approach. They use exclusion restrictions in the form of variables a¤ecting future
utilities but not current utilities to identify the discount factor; see Dubé et al. (2014), Wang (2014),
Fang and Wang (2015), and Ching and Osborne (2017). We do not rely on these assumptions.
A nonparametric payo¤ function without any restriction cannot be identied even if the discount
factor is known. The fundamental identication characteristic in a discrete choice model can be
traced to the static random utility model of McFadden (1974), where utility is ordinal and its level
cannot be identied. Some form of normalization has to be made. Aguirregabiria and Suzuki (2014,
AS hereafter) recently highlight the undesirable e¤ects that an arbitrary normalization have on
un-normalized parameters and counterfactual studies, and emphasize the importance of identiable
objects without any normalization; also see Kaloupsidi et al. (2016a, 2016b). An important question
then is whether our identication result is robust to misspecifying the normalization choice.
We verify that our identication of the discount factor is robust against any normalization choice.
The payo¤ parameters are not robust, but some of their meaningful combinations are. To this
end we also contribute to the literature by providing a nonparametric framework to identify the
payo¤ parameters that arise from changing in the actions of players between time periods. We call
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these switching costs1. For example, in an entry/exit model, they are entry cost and scrap value.
Individually the entry cost and scrap value cannot be separately identied but their di¤erence, the
sunk entry cost, can be identied. We show that switching costs can be written explicitly in terms of
the observed choice probabilities, independently of the discount factor as well as other (non switching
costs) components of the payo¤ function. AS has already shown the sunk entry costs in several IO
models can be identied in this fashion. We extend these results to sunk investment costs that can
arise from rm investing and divesting, as well as individual switching costs themselves under other
a priori restrictions.
A general discussion on the non-identication of the a dynamic model we consider can be found
in Rust (1994). Positive identication is possible when more structures are imposed on the prim-
itives. Magnac and Thesmar (2002) have shown the problem of identifying the payo¤ parameters
nonparametrically when all other primitives of the model are assumed to be known can be reduced to
a study of solutions to a linear system; also see Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008) and Bajari
et al. (2009). We are interested in the payo¤ parameters as well as the discount factor. The discount
factor enters the decision problem recursively and thereby introduces nonlinearity in the model.
Magnac and Thesmar (2002, Section 4.2) suggest that exclusion or parametric restrictions can
be used to identify the discount factor. For the former, their Proposition 4 illustrates in a simple
two-period model the discount factor is in fact typically overidentied. The identifying restriction
is that: for some states utilities in the rst period are the same but di¤er in the second period.
This idea has been elaborated, and applied in di¤erent empirical contexts, by Dube et al. (2014),
Wang (2014), Fang and Wang (2015), and Ching and Osborne (2017) amongst others. On the other
hand, while it may be plausible to assume identication is possible in a parametric model we are not
aware of any theoretical result that has veried this to be true. In particular establishing parametric
identication in a general nonlinear model is a non-trivial task; see Komunjer (2012) for a recent
illustration. We prove identication using a pseudo-model that is linear in the payo¤ parameters
conditioning on the discount factor. We construct a one-dimensional criterion function to be used
for identication. It exploits the conditional linear structure to prole out the payo¤ parameters
and reduce the nonlinear nature of the problem to just one dimension. The criterion function we
construct to establish identication has a sample counterpart that can be used for estimation.
In many IO applications, switching costs are often the essence of a dynamic decision problem and
can even be the central object of the dynamic model itself (e.g. see Slade (1998), and also the general
discussions in Ackerberg et al. (2007) and Pesendorfer (2010)). Our study on the switching costs takes
1We use the term switching costs that shares the same spirit as generic adjustment costs and other inertia. Examples
of usages in various elds of economics and marketing include the cost to change in health insurance plan, changing
of credit and other utility providers, and retailers decisions on promotions.
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a nonparametric approach. We identify combinations of the switching costs by exploiting empirically
motivated exclusion and testable independence assumptions. A key step involves eliminating common
future expected discounted payo¤s that arise from di¤erent states. Our result does not depend on the
discount factor and some other components of the payo¤ function. The robust identication of this
nature has precedence in the literature but has not been highlighted.2 For example, an inspection
of Proposition 2 in Aguirregabiria and Suzuki (2014) will reveal that the same implication of our
Theorem 2 has already been obtained for a binary action game of entry/exit3. We provide closed-
form expressions for switching costs and their combinations in terms of only the observed choice
probabilities. They can therefore be trivially estimated. They also suggest overidentication test
can be constructed by comparing against other estimates of switching costs obtained under additional
assumptions on the model primitives.
Throughout the paper our identication results are obtained using a pseudo-model under the
assumption that the choice and transition probabilities are nonparametrically identied. These same
probabilities are used to compute expected payo¤s in a pseudo-decision problem for all values of the
model parameters as opposed to the actual (full-solution) model where equilibrium probabilities are
used. The pseudo-model is used because it is tractable. Indeed a pseudo-model is the basis for any
two-step estimation procedures, following Hotz andMiller (1993), that are preferred on computational
grounds over the full-solution nested xed-point algorithm of Rust (1987). The estimator we propose
in this paper will be based on the two-step approach of Sanches et al. (2016) with computational
simplicity in mind. It is worth noting that, although consistent, a simple two-step estimator like ours
tend to have larger nite sample bias and is less e¢ cient than estimators that enforce the equilibrium
restriction of the model. Equilibrium constraints can be imposed during estimation with additional
computational cost, also without the need to solve out a dynamic optimization problem (cf. Rust
(1987)). E.g. Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002, 2007) and Egesdal, Lai and Su (2015) have shown the
fully e¢ cient maximum likelihood estimator can be obtained in this way.
When the data come from a single time series, or when they are pooled across short panels of
multiple homogeneous markets, the choice and transition probabilities are nonparametrically iden-
tied under weak conditions. In practice many datasets are short panels, where it would be more
reasonable to assume some form of unobserved heterogeneity exists across markets. A exible yet
tractable way to model unobserved heterogeneity in this literature is to use a nite mixture model.
For example Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007) suggest economic agentspayo¤s have time-invariant
2In one instance, for a slightly di¤erent model with a mixed continuous-discrete decision variable, Hong and Shum
(2010) rely on a deterministic state transition rule to dene a pairwise- di¤erence estimator that matches on, and
thereby avoid computing, future expected discounted payo¤s from di¤erent states.
3We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out to us.
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unobserved market specic component that is unobserved to the econometrician, therefore markets
of di¤erent types have di¤erent equilibrium distributions on the observables. Kasahara and Shimotsu
(2009) and Arcidiacono and Miller (2011) have given conditions so that the probabilities for each
mixture type can be nonparametrically identied under di¤erent frameworks, thereby extending the
scope of applying two-step estimation methods to models with unobserved heterogeneity. All iden-
tication results in our paper are valid in such setting as long as we can identify the type specic
probabilities to be able to set up the corresponding pseudo-decision problem. Specically the degree
of overidentication on the model primitives increases proportionally to the number of mixture types.
The class of decision problems we consider is a special case of dynamic games described in
Aguirregabiria and Nevo (2010) and Bajari, Hong and Nekipelov (2010). All of our intuition and
results are applicable to these games. The most parts of this paper focus on the single agent model
for notational simplicity and clarity of idea, and to abstract ourselves away from game specic issues
(such as multiple equilibria). For the same reasoning given for models with unobserved heterogeneity,
the portability of our results to dynamic games is immediate as long as the choice and transition
probabilities can be consistently estimated nonparametrically. The numerical studies of our proposed
estimators are in fact performed in a dynamic game setting. The details on extending our single
agents results to games can be found in the Appendix.
We perform a Monte Carlo study of our proposed estimators using the simulation design in
Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008). We then use the dataset from Ryan (2012) to estimate a
dynamic game played between rms in the US Portland cement industry. In our version of the game,
rms choose whether to enter the market as well as decide on the capacity level of operation (ve
di¤erent levels). We assume rms compete in a capacity constrained Cournot game, so the period
prot can be estimated directly from the data as done in Ryan. The primitives we estimate are
the discount factor, xed operating cost, and 25 switching cost parameters. We estimate the model
twice. Once using the data from before 1990, and once after 1990, which coincides with the date
of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments (1990 CAAA). Our estimates on switching costs generally
appear sensible, having correct signs and relative magnitudes. They show that rms entering the
market with a higher capacity level incur larger costs, and suggest that increasing capacity level is
generally costly while a reduction can return some revenue. We nd that operating and entry costs
are generally higher after the 1990 CAAA, which supports Ryans key nding. We are also able to
estimate the discount factor with reasonable precision.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the theoretical model and
the basic modeling assumptions. Section 3 gives a joint identication result on the discount factor
and the payo¤ parameters with a linear specication. Section 4 studies nonparametric identication
of the switching costs. Section 5 illustrates the performance and use of our estimator with simulated
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and real data. Section 6 concludes. The Appendix contains details for extending our identication
results to dynamic games.
Notations. We use  (A) ; CS (A) ;A> and Ay to respectively denote the rank, column space,
transpose and Moore-Penrose inverse of matrix A. For any positive integers p; q, we let Ip and 0pq
respectively denote the identity matrix of size p and a p q matrix of zeros.
2 Basic Modelling Framework
We begin by describing an innite time horizon dynamic discrete choice model as in Rust (1987,
1994).4 Given our empirical examples and application below, we shall sometimes refer to our repre-
sentative economic agent as a rm and her payo¤s as prots. Let t 2 f1; 2; : : : ;1g denote time. The
random variables in our model are: the action and state variables, denoted by at and st respectively. at
takes values from a nite set of alternatives A = f0; 1; : : : ; Jg. st  (xt; "t) 2 XRJ+1, whereX  R.
xt is public information to both the rm and the econometrician, while "t  ("t (0) ; : : : ; "t (J)) 2 RJ+1
is private information only observed by the rm. Future states are uncertain. Todays action and
states a¤ect outcomes for states in the future. The evolution of the states is summarized by a Markov
transition law P (st+1jst; at). The rms period payo¤ function is u (at; st) 2 R. Future periods pay-
o¤s are discounted at the rate  2 [0; 1). At time t the rms observes st and chooses an action
optimally. Specically, at   (st) so that,
 (s) = arg max
a2A
fu (a; s) + E [V (st+1) jst = s; at = a]g; (1)
where V (s) = max
a2A
fu (a; s) + E [V (st+1) jst = s; at = a]g :
Using the optimal decision rule we can remove the max operator and write the value function as,
V (s) = E
" 1X
t=0
tu (at; st) js0 = s
#
: (2)
The expectation operators in the displays above integrate out variables with respect to the probability
distribution induced by the equilibrium choice probabilities and Markov transition law. As standard
in the literature we assume the following assumptions.
Assumption M:
(i) (Additive Separability) For all a; x; ":
u (a; x; ") =  (a; x) + " (a) :
4The innite time feature simplies the notation. Our identication strategy is valid for nite time horizon models
with/out absorbing state; e.g. Hotz and Miller (1993).
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(ii) (Conditional Independence) The transition distribution of the states has the following factor-
ization for all x0; "0; x; "; a:
P (x0; "0jx; "; a) = Q ("0)G (x0jx; a) ;
where Q is the cumulative distribution function of "t and G denotes the transition law of xt+1
conditioning on xt; at. Furthermore, "t has nite rst moments, and a positive, continuous and
bounded density on RJ+1.
(iii) (Finite Observed State) X = f1; : : : ; Kg.
The primitives of the model under this setting consist of (; ;Q;G). Throughout the paper
we shall assume (G;Q) to be known. G can be identied from the data when (at; xt; xt+1) are
observed. Consistent estimation of the joint distribution of (at; xt; xt+1) holds under weak conditions
with a single time series, as well as repeated observations from short panels when there is no other
unobserved heterogeneity. Q is typically assumed known in most empirical applications. Conditions
for the identication of Q exist using a large support type argument, e.g. see Aguirregabiria and
Suzuki (2014, Proposition 1) and Chen (2014, Theorem 4). On the other hand our results do not
depend on any continuity assumption to achieve identication as we take xt to be a discrete random
variable.
Our subsequent analysis will use as the starting point the fact that we can identify the choice
probability from data, which in turn is informative about (; ). More specically, for any a > 0, let
v (a; x)  v (a; x)  v (0; x), where v (a; x) denotes the choice-specic value function that serves as
the mean utility in a discrete choice modelling:
v (a; x) =  (a; x) + E [V (st+1) jxt = x; at = a] ; (3)
Pr [at = ajxt = x] = Pr [v (a; x) v (a0; x) > "t (a0)  "t (a) for all a0 6= a] :
By inverting the choice probabilities (Hotz and Miller (1993)) we can recoverv (a; x) for all a > 0; x.
3 Identifying the Discount Factor with Linear-in-Parameter
Payo¤s
In this section we assume the payo¤ function takes on a linear-in-parameter specication. Section
3.1 denes the identication concept for the discount factor and payo¤ parameters. Section 3.2
provides some representation lemmas that will be useful for dening a criterion function to study
identication. Section 3.3 gives the identication result.
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3.1 Denition of Parametric Identication
We will assume Assumption M and the following assumption throughout this section.
Assumption P (Linear-in-Parameter): For all a; x:
 (a; x; ) = 0 (a; x) + 
>1 (a; x) ,
where 0 is a known real value function, 1 is a known p dimensional vector value function and 
belongs to Rp.
Assumption P can be interpreted as nonparametric. For example it can represent an unrestricted
nonparametric function of  by by assigning a parameter for each pair of a and x. However, such
function is too rich and cannot be identied. We will maintain the parametric appearance for  as
we will be exploiting any nonparametric restrictions in our study on identifying the discount factor.
The role of 0 is to represent the payo¤ components that are identiable without the knowledge
of the discount factor. In practice 0 and possibly parts of 1 may have to be estimated (e.g. see
Section 5.2). For the purpose of identication they can be treated as known. The primitives in this
setting are (; ). They belong to B where B = [0; 1) and  = Rp. We are interested in the data
generating discount factor and payo¤ parameters, which we denote by 0 and 0 respectively.
We begin by dening the parametric choice-specic value function (cf. equation (3)):
v (a; x; ; ) 
1X
t=0
tE [ (at; xt; ) + "t (at) ja0 = a; x0 = x] : (4)
Then we dene v (a; x; ; )  v (a; x; ; )   v (0; x; ; ). It is important to recall the sequence
fat; xt; "tg1t=0 in equation (4) follows an optimal controlled process consistent with (0; 0). Therefore,
using Hotz-Millers inversion, it follows that v (a; x; 0; 0) is identied from the observed choice
probabilities for all a; x.
We take each pair (; ) to be a structure of the empirical model and its implied choice-specic
values, denoted by V;  fv (a; x; ; )ga;x2AX , to be its corresponding reduced form. We then
dene identication using the notion of observational equivalence in terms of the expected payo¤s.
Definition I1 (Observational Equivalence): Any distinct (; ) and (0; 0) in B  are
observationally equivalent if and only if V; = V0;0 .
Definition I2 (Identification): An element in B  , say (; ), is identied if and only if
(0; 0) and (; ) are not observationally equivalent for all (0; 0) 6= (; ) in B .
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For our identication study we dene our statistical model to be fV;g;2B.5 It is appropriate
to call fV;g;2B a pseudo-model in the sense that V; characterizes the optimal decision rule
when the random variables in equation (4) follow an optimal controlled process consistent with
(0; 0) rather than (; ). I.e. the reduced form of a pseudo-model comes from an economic agent
solving a pseudo-decision problem. All statements made on identication in Section 3 are within the
context of the model described by fV;g;2B.
Note that we can also dene a statistical model based on probability distributions as in the
traditional studies of identication. Specically, by letting
P;  fPr [v (a; x; ; ) v (a0; x; ; ) > " (a0)  " (a) for all a0 6= a]ga;x2AX :
It is known there is a one-to-one relation between fV;g;2B and fP;g;2B; see Matzkin
(1991), Hotz and Miller (1993), and Norets and Takahashi (2013). Therefore identication for our
decision problem can be equivalently established with either fV;g;2B or fP;g;2B.
3.2 Some Representation Lemmas
The advantage of a pseudo-model is that V; is mathematically tractable as a function of (; ).
Under Assumptions M and P, it shall be useful to separate out the contributions of the expected
discounted payo¤s in (4) as follows:
v (a; x; ; ) = 0 (a; x) + 
1X
t=0
tE [0 (at; xt) ja0 = a; x0 = x]
+
1X
t=0
tE ["t (at) ja0 = a; x0 = x]
+>(1 (a; x) + 
1X
t=0
tE [1 (at; xt) ja0 = a; x0 = x]):
5The traditional literature on identication in econometrics uses probability distributions to describe a statistical
model. Let
P;  fPr [v (a; x;; ) v (a0; x;; ) > " (a0)  " (a) for all a0 6= a]ga;x2AX :
There is in fact a one-to-one relation between fV;g;2B and fP;g;2B; see Matzkin (1991), Hotz and
Miller (1993), and Norets and Takahashi (2013). Therefore identication for our decision problem can be equivalently
established with either fV;g;2B or fP;g;2B.
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Subsequently, by dening l (a; x)  l (a; x)  l (0; x) for l = 0; 1, we have:
v (a; x; ; ) = 0 (a; x) + 
1X
t=0
t (E [0 (at; xt) ja0 = a; x0 = x]  E [0 (at; xt) ja0 = 0; x0 = x])
+
1X
t=0
t (E ["t (at) ja0 = a; x0 = x]  E ["t (at) ja0 = 0; x0 = x])
+>(1 (a; x) + 
1X
t=0
t (E [1 (at; xt) ja0 = a; x0 = x]  E [1 (at; xt) ja0 = 0; x0 = x])):
The decomposition of v helps us distinguish how  and/or  a¤ect di¤erent parts of the per-period
payo¤s. Lemma 1 summarizes this in a matrix form.
Lemma 1: Under Assumptions M and P, for all a > 0, v (a; x; ; ) can be collected in the
following vector form for all (; ) 2 B :
va (; ) = Ra0 + H
a (IK   L) 1 R0 (5)
+Ha (IK   L) 1 
+
 
Ra1 + H
a (IK   L) 1 R1

;
where the elements in the above display are collected and explained in Tables A and B.
Matrix Dimension Representing
Ra1 K  p 1 (a; )
R1 K  p 1 (a; )
L K K E[ (xt+1) jxt = ]
Ha K K E[ (xt+1) jxt = ; at = a]
Ha K K E[ (xt+1) jxt = ; at = a]  E[ (xt+1) jxt = ; at = 0]
Table A. The matrices consist of (di¤erences in) expected payo¤s and probabilities. The latter
represent conditional expectations for any function  of xt+1.
Vector Representing
 E ["t (at)jxt = ]
Ra0 0 (a; )
R0 E [0 (at; xt) jxt = ]
Ha (IK   L) 1 R0
P1
t=0 
t (E [0 (at; xt) ja0 = a; x0 = x]  E [0 (at; xt) ja0 = 0; x0 = x])
Ha (IK   L) 1 R1
P1
t=0 
t (E [1 (at; xt) ja0 = a; x0 = x]  E [1 (at; xt) ja0 = 0; x0 = x])
Ha (IK   L) 1 
P1
t=0 
t (E ["t (at) ja0 = a; x0 = x]  E ["t (at) ja0 = 0; x0 = x])
Table B. The K  1 vectors represent (di¤erences in) expected payo¤s.
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Proof: This is a special case of Lemma R in Sanches et al. (2016).
All vectors and matrices in Tables A and B are either known or estimable from the choice and
transitional probabilities. The tables will serve as a useful reference for constructing the necessary
components we use for dening the criterion function in Section 3.3.
Given that we can identify va (0; 0) for all a > 0, to identify (0; 0), it is su¢ cient to show
that for all (; ) 6= (0; 0), va (; ) 6= va (0; 0) for some a. Our next lemma provides a
characterization as to how changing  and  can a¤ect va.
Lemma 2: Under Assumptions M and P, for any a > 0 and (; ) ; (0; 0) 2 B :
va (; ) va (; 0) =  Ra1 + Ha (IK   L) 1 R1 (   0) ; (6)
va (0; 0) va (; 0) = (   0) Ha (IK   0L) 1 (IK   L) 1 (R0 + R10 + ) : (7)
And (; ) is identiable if and only if there is no other (0; 0) such that for all a > 0:
va (0; 0) va (; 0) = va (; ) va (; 0) :
Proof: Follows from some algebra based on equation (5).
Lemma 2 illustrates the nature of the identication problem we have at hand. We highlight the
following particulars:
(i) If the discount rate is assumed to be known, from (6), a su¢ cient condition for va (0; ) 6=
va (0; 
0) when  6= 0 is that Ra1 + Ha (IK   L) 1 R1 has full column rank for some a > 0.
(ii) If the payo¤ function is assumed to be known, from (7), a su¢ cient condition forva (0; 0) 6=
va (; 0) when  6= 0 is that (R0 + R10 + ) 6= 0 and Ha is invertible some a > 0.
(iii) Suppose p is large relative to K. Then for any a > 0 such that Ra1 +H
a (IK   L) 1 R1
has rank K, and for any 0;  6= 0 that va (0; 0) 6= va (; 0), by equating (6) and (7), we can
always nd  such that va (0; 0) = va (; ).
Point (i) shows that su¢ cient conditions for identication of the payo¤ parameters when the
discount rate is assumed known can be easily stated and veried. More generally the su¢ cient
condition for the identication of the payo¤parameter can be stated in terms of the full column rank
of the matrix that stacks together Ra1 + H
a (IK   L) 1 R1 over a. In the case we are able to
identify the payo¤ function outside of the dynamic model, (ii) shows that the discount factor can
also be identied and provide one type of su¢ cient conditions that can be readily checked. Point (iii)
shares the intuition along the line of Manski (1993) that when the parameterization on the payo¤
function is too rich, (; ) may not identiable in B .
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From Lemma 2, it is also apparent that we should be able to identify (0; 0) jointly when the
change in the vector of expected payo¤s from altering the discount factor moves in a di¤erent direction
to the change caused by altering the payo¤ parameters.
3.3 Sum of Squares Criterion Function
The study of identication involving the discount factor is complicated due to the fact that V; is
nonlinear in (; ). However, for a given , we can see from (5) that V; is linear in . We use
proling to exploit the conditional linearity to simplify the identication problem for a nonlinear
model with p+ 1 parameters to a one-dimensional problem.
Let ma (; )  va (0; 0) va (; ). Then we can write, using (5):
ma (; ) = aa () Ba () ;
aa ()  va (0; 0) Ra0   Ha (IK   L) 1 (R0 + ) ;
Ba ()  Ra1 + Ha (IK   L) 1 R1:
It is clear that ma (; ) is linear in  for any given . We can stack together the system of equations
above across a. In doing so we obtain the following vector value function, m : B ! RKJ :
m (; ) = a () B () ; (8)
where a () is a KJ  1 vector and B () is a KJ  p matrix.
LetM (; )  km (; )k, i.e. M (; ) is the Euclidean norm ofm (; ). Then by construction,
M (; ) = 0 if (; ) = (0; 0) ;
and any other (; ) such thatM (; ) = 0 is observationally equivalent to (0; 0) by the property
of the norm. ThereforeM has the necessary property to serve as a criterion for identication.
Next we prole out  in order to reduce the dimensionality onM by exploiting its least squares
structure. For each , run a regression of a () on B (), we can dene:
 ()  (B ()>B ())yB ()> a () :
So that  () is a least squares solution to min2M (; ). Then we dene:
M () M (;  ()) :
By construction it also holds that
M () = 0 if  = 0:
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In this way we have reduced the parameter space in the identication problem to a one-dimensional
one. Furthermore the domain of the parameter space is on a small interval: [0; 1). The reasoning is
analogous to proling in an estimation routine. Particularly we can ignore any  that does not lie in
arg min2M (; ) since necessarily,
M (; ) >M (;  ())  0:
Therefore (0; 0) is identied when M () has a unique minimum and min2M (0; ) has a
unique solution.
Theorem 1: Under Assumptions M and P, (0; 0) is identiable in fV;g;2B if
M () = 0 if and only if  = 0;
and B (0) has full column rank.
Proof: Suppose (0; 0) is identiable. If there is 
0 6= 0 such that M (0) = 0, then
va (0; 0) = v
a (0;  (0)) for all a by the property of the norm. Since  is a closed set,
by the projection theorem,  (0) exists and is the unique element in . This leads to a contradic-
tion since (0; 0) and (
0;  (0)) are observationally equivalent. Next, suppose that B (0) does
not have full column rank. Let 0 be another element in arg min2M (0; ) that di¤ers from 0.
SinceM (0; )  0 for all  2  andM (0; 0) = 0,M (0; 0) = 0. Thus (0; 0) and (0; 0) are
observationally equivalent, also a contradiction.
Comments on Theorem 1:
(i) High Level Assumptions. Conditions in Theorem 1 are high level as we do not relate them
to the underlying primitives of the model. However, they are statements made on objects that
are observed or can be consistently estimated nonparametrically. In the Appendix we give a more
detailed conditions forM to have a unique minimum.
(ii) Feasible Check and Estimation. Since we have reduced the identication problem to a single-
parameter that can reside only in a narrow range, there is no need to refer to complicated results
for the identication of a general nonlinear model. We can use the sample parts of components in
Tables A and B to consistently estimateM () for all . So one can plot the sample counterpart
of M over B for an exhaustive analysis of the problem. Once the minimum of M is found, the
corresponding rank matrix can then be checked. This suggests one natural way to estimate the
discount factor, namely by grid search. In practice we can detect an identication problem if the
sample counterpart ofM contains a at region at the minimum, or when the sample counterpart
of B (0) does not have full column rank.
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By inspecting of the proof of Theorem 1 it is clear there are some separation between the identi-
ability of 0 and 0. In particular we have dened 
 () using a generalized inverse of the matrix
B ()>B (). Therefore 0 can be identied even if 0 is not.
The full rank condition on B (0) is not an innocuous assumption when we view Assumption P
as a representation of a nonparametric function. In practice this is often delivered by an exclusion
assumption or more generally normalization of certain payo¤ parameters. Next section we will focus
on payo¤ parameters that we call switching costs. We will revisit the question of identiability of
the discount factor under di¤erent normalization choice in Section 4.3.
4 Nonparametric Identication of Switching Costs
In this section we consider payo¤ functions under nonparametric restrictions that allow us to obtain
closed-form expressions for the switching costs parameters. In Section 4.1 we dene a switching cost
function and explain the assumptions required for our identication result. Section 4.2 gives the
identication result. Section 4.3 relates the identication of the discount factor under Assumption P
to models with switching costs.
4.1 Switching Costs
The payo¤function cannot be nonparametrically identied without any restrictions. Economic theory
can help guide how to impose structures on the payo¤ function. A main consideration in making
a dynamic discrete decision is how a change in ones action from the previous period immediately
a¤ect todays payo¤s. Actions from the past are therefore often important components of the state
variables.
In order to highlight the role of switching costs we distinguish past actions from other state
variables. At time t we denote actions from the previous period by wt, so that wt  at 1. We denote
the switching cost from changing action from w to a by SCw!a. Subsequently, in this section we
shall maintain an updated version of Assumption M where xt is replaced with (wt; xt) everywhere.
In addition we impose the following assumptions.
Assumption N
(i) (Decomposition of Prots): For all a; w; x:
 (a; w; x) =  (a; x) +  (a  w;w; x) ;
such that  (0; w; x) = 0.
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(ii) (Conditional Independence): The distribution of xt+1 conditional on at and xt is independent
of wt.
The decomposition of  in N(i) may appear peculiar but it is typical in many empirical IO
applications. We will give an interpretation of its components in the context of an IO model. The
dening feature of  is that it excludes past actions.  can represent the rms operational prot in
the current period, such as variable prots and operational costs, which does not depend on actions
from the past.  is the switching cost function that takes non-zero values only when a change of
action occurs. Note that, by construction, we have
 (a  w;w; x) = SCw!a (x)  1 [w 6= a] ; (9)
where 1 [] denotes the indicator function.
Assumption N(ii) imposes that knowing actions from the past does not help predict future state
variables when the present action and other observable state variables are known. Note that N(ii) is
not implied by M(ii). In many applications fxtg is simply assumed to be a strictly exogenous rst
order Markov process. Specically this implies xt+1 is independent of at conditional on xt in addition
to N(ii). In any case, unlike M(ii), N(ii) is a restriction made on the observables so it can be tested
directly from the data. Later we shall show how xt can be modied to contain past actions so N(ii)
can be weakened to allow for dependence of other state variables with past actions.
Even under Assumption N(i) identication issue persists (e.g. see the discussion in Aguirregabiria
and Suzuki (2014)). SCw!a cannot be identied for all w 6= a without any further restrictions. Some
of their di¤erences can be identied. For example identication is possible if we normalize some
baseline switching costs to be known. We will look at di¤erent restrictions that can be used to
identify individual or combination of the switching costs. Before giving the formal result we provide
an intuition as to why Assumption N is helpful for identifying the switching costs, and illustrate the
key steps of our identication strategy.
Exclusion and Independence Restrictions
Consider a two-period entry/exit decision problem. Let A = f0; 1g, where 0 denotes exit and
1 denotes entry. Then SC0!1 and SC1!0 respectively have interpretations of entry cost and scrap
value. In this case we can write
 (a  w;w; x) = SC0!1 (x)  a (1  w) + SC1!0 (x)  (1  a)w: (10)
The choice-specic value function (cf. (3)) in this model is:
 (a; w; x) =  (a; w; x) + E [ (at+1; wt+1; xt+1) jat = a; wt = w; xt = x] :
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Let  (w; x)   (1; w; x)    (0; w; x). At time t, a rm will enter if and only if  (w; x) >
"t (0)  "t (1). We can identify  from the observed choice probabilities.
The role of our assumptions is to isolate todays switching costs from the remaining components
in the choice-specic value function. Specically, we apply N(i) to decompose the prot function in
the current period and use N(ii) to simplify the expected future prots. We can then re-write the
equation above as
 (a; w; x) =  (a; x) +  (a  w;w; x) ; where
 (a; x) =  (a; x) + E [ (at+1; a; xt+1) jat = a; xt = x] :
Crucially note that the conditional expectation on future prots in  no longer depends on wt under
N(ii) by the law of iterated expectation. We treat  as a nuisance parameter; it is a nonparametric
object that depends on all primitives in the model. Let  (x)   (1; x)   (0; x). Using equation
(10) we have,
 (w; x) =  (x) + SC0!1 (x)  (1  w)  SC1!0 (x)  w: (11)
It is now clear we can identify a combination of the switching costs by di¤erencing out  in the
equation above:
 (1; x)  (0; x) =  SC0!1 (x)  SC1!0 (x) : (12)
In an entry/exit game the quantity  SC0!1   SC1!0 represents the sunk entry cost that a rm
cannot recover back once it decides to leave the market after entering. Equation (12) shows the
sunk entry cost can be identied independently of  and . On the other hand it is well known
that entry cost and scrap value cannot be nonparametrically identied separately in this particular
model. In an empirical work an unidentied object gets normalized. It is clear from equation (12)
that either the entry cost or scrap value can be identied if other parameter is assumed to be known.
For example, a common assumption is to normalize the scrap value to be zero, the entry cost can be
estimated conditionally on this value along with the other parameters.
The identication strategy above can be generalized substantially. Results for a more general
decision model under M and N can be obtained with little modication. The extension to dynamic
games is more complex. It requires more notations and the notion of a di¤erence generalizes to
projection of a matrix. We defer these details to the Appendix.
4.2 Closed-Form Identication
We start by providing an expression for the di¤erences in choice-specic valuations that generalizes
equation (11). For any a > 0, let v (a; w; x)  v (a; w; x) v (0; w; x),  (a; x)   (a; x)  (0; x),
and  (a; w; x)   (a  w;w; x)   ( w;w; x). Lemma 3 generalizes equation (11).
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Lemma 3: Under Assumptions M and N, we have for all i; a > 0 and w; x:
v (a; w; x) =  (a; x) +  (a; w; x) ; (13)
where
 (a; x)   (a; x)   (0; x) +  (em (a; x)  em (0; x)) ;em (a; x)  E [m (a; xt+1) jat = a; xt = x] ;
m (w; x)  E [V (st) jwt = w; xt = x] :
Proof: Using the law of iterated expectation, the value function as dened in equation (2),
satises E [V (st+1) jat; wt; xt] = E [m (wt+1; xt+1) jat; wt; xt] under M(ii). E [m (wt+1; xt+1) jat; wt; xt]
can be simplied further to E [em (at; xt) jat; xt] after another application of the law of iterated expec-
tation and imposing N(ii). The remainder of the proof then follows from the denitions of the terms
dened in the text.
Components of v are  and . We treat  as a nuisance parameter.  contains the
switching costs of interest, for any a; w; x:
 (a; w; x) = SCw!a (x)  1 [w 6= a]  SCw!0 (x)  1 [w 6= 0] : (14)
As seen previously we can identify di¤erences in  by eliminating . This can be done by looking
at di¤erences of v (a; w; x) across di¤erent w while holding (a; x) xed.
Theorem 2: Under Assumptions M and N, we have for all a > 0 and x;w;w0:
 (a; w; x)  (a; w0; x) = v (a; w; x) v (a; w0; x) : (15)
Theorem 2 follows immediately from Lemma 3. Equation (15) tells us that we can always identify
some combinations of the switching costs nonparametrically. Importantly the identied objects do
not depend on  or .
Comments on Theorem 2.
(i) Certain di¤erences in  in equation (15) are economically meaningful. For example we have
already introduced the sunk entry cost in the entry/exit model. The notion of sunk costs naturally
generalizes when there is a varying degree of commitment. More specically consider an investment
or capacity game where it costs a rm to choose at > at 1, and conversely a rm can divest to recover
some of these costs by choosing at < at 1. In this case  SCa0!a   SCa!a0 with a > a0 represents
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a sunk investment cost for a rm that increases its investment level from a0 to a, and divest back
to a0. Using equations (14) and (15), Corollaries 1 and 2 give closed-form expressions for identifying
the sunk investment costs.
Corollary 1. For all a > 0; x:
 SC0!a (x)  SCa!0 (x) = v (a; a; x) v (a; 0; x) :
Corollary 2. For all a; a0 > 0; x:
 SCa0!a (x)  SCa!a0 (x) = v (a; a; x) + v (a0; a0; x) v (a; a0; x) v (a0; a; x) :
(ii) We would prefer to identify the switching costs individually. However, without further in-
formation, they are not identied nonparametrically for this type of models; for example see Aguir-
regabiria and Suzuki (2014) for a thorough discussion. But identication can be achieved if we are
willing to impose some constraints on the switching costs. One example is by assuming symmetry of
switching costs between any two actions, which would be reasonable in applications with logistical
or physical adjustment costs such as the traditional menu costs (e.g. see Slade (1998)). Corollary
3 shows that individual switching costs under symmetry are identied. It follows immediately from
Corollaries 1 and 2.
Corollary 3. For all a; a0; x, suppose that SCa
0!a (x) = SCa!a
0
(x), then for any a; a0 > 0:
SC0!a (x) =   (v (a; a; x) v (a; 0; x)) =2;
SCa!a
0
(x) =  (v (a; a; x) + v (a0; a0; x) v (a; a0; x) v (a0; a; x))=2:
(iii) In many applications components of the switching costs are taken to be known. Typically
this is done by way of a normalization assumption. The most commonly used assumption is taking
action zero yields zero payo¤. For example, for an entry or investment game with entry, such
assumption means a rm has no recovery value of assets upon leaving the market. In others, some
institutional knowledge outside of the dynamic model are used. For example Kalouptsidi (2014) uses
data on resale value of second hand ships to estimate scrap values and entry costs directly. Another
example, in a study of promotion pricing decisions, is My´sliwski et al. (2017) who rely on anecdotal
evidence to assume a cost is incurred to producers when a promotion is on while there is no costs for
switching back to the regular price. In these cases we can identify individual switching costs directly
as Corollary 4 shows.
Corollary 4. For all a0, suppose SCa
0!0 (x) = 0 (w; x) then for any a; a
0; x:
SCa
0!a (x) = v (a; a0; x) v (a; a; x) + 0 (a0; x)  0 (a; x) : (16)
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It is important to highlight that assigning incorrect values to 0 generally leads to incorrect values
of SCw!a. However, it is easy to verify that certain combinations of switching costs, including those
in Corollaries 1 and 2, are robust against any choice of 0.
(iv) Generally Corollaries 1 and 2 can be informative on the validity of a particular normalization
choice since they themselves are derived without normalization. For example, let us go back to
the discussion on investment game at the end of our rst comment where there is a divestment
opportunity. In this context it would be natural to assume that  SCa0!a   SCa!a0 = c0 > 0 when
a > a0. Then, given both  SCa0!a and SCa!a0 are positive, it must be the case that  SCa0!a is
bounded below by c0.
(v) When A = f0; 1g our Theorem 1 implies the sunk entry cost can be identied without any
normalization. Proposition 2 in Aguirregabiria and Suzuki (2014) has established the same result
using a di¤erent argument.
The results of Theorem 2 and Corollaries 1 to 4 are constructive. We can replace the unknown v
using the empirical choice probabilities. The sample analog estimators can be computed without any
optimization. Given the empirical literature is concerned with the computational cost our closed-
form identication result can substantially reduce the number of parameters to be estimated in a
model. Such estimators will be consistent and asymptotically normal as long as the initial choice
probabilities have these properties.
4.3 Identication and Normalization
We have emphasized that normalizations of switching costs are necessary in many situations. The
validity of the identication of payo¤ parameters can depend directly on the normalization choice.
Now we study the e¤ect of normalizations on the identication of the discount factor.
In the empirical IO literature the discount factor is customarily assumed to be known while the
focus on identication falls on which payo¤ parameters can (or cannot) be identied. A particular
normalization choice is made by assigning a value to an unknown parameter as previously explained.
The normalization assumption is made independent to the choice of the discount factor. The non-
identiability of the payo¤ parameters considered in practice therefore mathematically translates to
the matrix B () in equation (8) being rank decient for all . For our result, we only need to
consider rank deciency at 0.
Recall that B (0) is a KJ  p matrix. Suppose  (B (0)) = r < p. I.e. the rank condition in
Theorem 1 fails. Then without any loss of generality we can write:
B (0) = [B1 : B2] ;
where B1 is a matrix consisting of the rst r columns of B (0) such that CS (B1) = CS (B (0)),
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and B2 is a matrix containing the last (p  r) columns of B (0). Since CS (B2)  CS (B1) there
exists an r  (p  r) matrix   such that B2 = B1 .
Now recall equation (8), where we dene m (; ) = a ()   B ()  to study identication. By
construction m (0; 0) = 0, which implies a (0) = B (0) 0. Let 01 and 02 respectively denote
column vectors containing the rst r elements and the last (p  r) elements of 0. Then it is easy to
verify that for any e2 2 Rp r we can construct e1 2 Rr such that,
a (0) = B101 + B202
= B1e1 + B2e2;
by setting e1 = 01 +  (02   e2)):
I.e. (0; 0) and (0;e), where e = [e>1 : e>2 ]>, are observationally equivalent. Therefore: if the
discount factor can be identied, it can be identied for all normalization choices. Our argument
can be straightforwardly extended to other normalization types (e.g. by assigning a value to a
combination of parameters) using basic linear algebra. An equivalent way to state this result is given
in the following proposition.
Proposition 1: Suppose M () = 0 if and only if  = 0, then (0; 0) and (0; 0 + ) are
observationally equivalent for all  that belongs to the null space of B (0).
The discount factor can therefore be identied independently of the normalization choice on
switching costs. Our discussion here also leads to another empirical fact that may not be obvious a
priori.
Suppose a particular  is chosen and it satises both P and N. Then there are two di¤erent ways
to estimate the switching costs based on our parametric and nonparametric identication approaches.
We have shown some combinations of the switching costs can be identied without any normalization
using the nonparametric approach. We are interested to know if the parametric approach in Section 3
that relies on a possibly incorrect normalization choice can consistently estimate these combinations.
The answer is positive. Consider any combination of the switching costs, which can be written
explicitly in terms of the di¤erences in choice-specic valuations (e.g. sunk costs, see Corollaries 1
and 2). A vector of such combinations can be represented by a0 for some matrix . Then for any e
such that (0;e) is observationally equivalent to (0; 0) we also have a0 = B (0) 0 = B (0)e.
I.e. the combinations of switching costs described by B (0) identify the same objects.
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5 Numerical Illustration
We illustrate the use of our identication strategies and implement the suggested estimators in the
previous sections. Section 5.1 gives results from a Monte Carlo study taken from Pesendorfer and
Schmidt-Dengler (2008). Section 5.2 estimates a discrete investment game using the data from Ryan
(2012).
5.1 Monte Carlo Study
The simulation design is the two-rm dynamic entry game taken from Section 7 in Pesendorfer and
Schmidt-Dengler (2008). In period t each rm i has two possible choices, ait 2 f0; 1g, with ait = 1
denoting entry. The only observed state variables are previous periods actions, wt = (a1t 1; a2t 1).
Using their notation, rm 10s period payo¤s are described as follows:
1 (a1t; a2t; xt; ) = a1t (1 + 2a2t) + a1t (1  a1t 1)F + (1  a1t) a1t 1W; (17)
where 1; 2; F and W are respectively the monopoly prot, duopoly prot, entry cost and scrap
value. The latter two components are switching costs. Each rm also receives additive private shocks
that are i.i.d. N (0; 1). The game is symmetric and Firms 2 payo¤s are dened analogously. The data
generating parameters are set as: (10; 20; F0;W0) = (1:2; 1:2; 0:2; 0:1) and 0 = 0:9. Pesendorfer
and Schmidt-Dengler (2008) show there are three distinct equilibria for this game.
The model satises both Assumptions MN and MP in the Appendix. We consider two estimation
methods. Method A proles out all the payo¤ parameters using the OLS expression and use grid
search to estimate the discount factor. Method B rst estimates the entry cost in closed-form
independently before proling out the other payo¤ parameters and use grid search to estimate the
discount factor. We are also interested to see how sensitive our estimates are with respect to the
normalization choice.
For each equilibrium we perform 10000 simulations with sample sizes N = 100; 1000; 10000. Since
the entry cost and scrap value cannot be jointly identied we estimate the model under di¤erent
normalized values for W . We report: the bias and standard deviation (in italics) for (b; b1; b2; bF )
and the sunk entry cost ( \SUNK); we use the bold font to highlight the statistics that correspond
to the correctly assumed choice of W . We estimate the sunk entry cost for Methods A and B by
rst estimating the entry cost and combine it with the assumed scrap value. In addition we also
estimate the sunk entry cost without normalizing the scrap value according to Example 1 in the
Appendix (also see Corollary 1). We label the columns of statistics for the sunk entry estimator with
no normalization by N-N. Tables 1-3 below correspond to the data generated according to the three
equilibria as enumerated in Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008) respectively.
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The ndings are in line with the theory part of the paper. First it shows the discount factor can
be consistently estimated. The consistency property is robust against the normalization choice of the
scrap value. The sunk entry cost can also be consistently estimated independently of the scrap value
used. When the model is correctly specied in the sense we correctly assume W = W0 all estimators
are consistent. While misspecifying the scrap value cause biases to all estimators of the individual
payo¤ parameters. The estimation results from Methods A and B, as well as N-N for the sunk entry,
are qualitatively the same across all equilibria. The performances between estimation methods
seem to depend on the equilibrium and sample size. Method A performs better in Equilibrium 1,
and generally in smaller samples. We may be able to attribute the di¤erence in smaller samples
performance to the fact that Method A fully exploits the correctly specied parametric form of the
payo¤ function while the others use nonparametric estimators. At larger sample sizes there appear
to be no dominating estimation methods for Equilibria 2 and 3.
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Method A Method B N-N
N W 0 0:1 0:2 0 0:1 0:2 -
100 b -0.0809 -0.0806 -0.0799 -0.0752 -0.0768 -0.0738 -
0.2697 0.2691 0.2686 0.2619 0.2640 0.2596b1 -0.0418 -0.0253 -0.0071 -0.0631 -0.0450 -0.0291 -
0.2974 0.3050 0.3150 0.3693 0.3774 0.3858b2 0.0627 0.0815 0.0988 0.0963 0.1141 0.1313 -
0.2970 0.2991 0.3029 0.4779 0.4801 0.4831bF 0.0446 -0.0554 -0.1552 -0.0019 -0.1017 -0.2021 -
0.2836 0.2835 0.2839 0.5692 0.5699 0.5702
\SUNK 0.0554 0.0554 0.0552 0.1019 0.1017 0.1021 0.0477
0.2836 0.2835 0.2839 0.5692 0.5699 0.5702 0.5935
1000 b -0.0356 -0.0372 -0.0380 -0.0328 -0.0339 -0.0343 -
0.1741 0.1790 0.1801 0.1677 0.1695 0.1715b1 -0.0051 0.0090 0.0229 -0.0028 0.0110 0.0244 -
0.1032 0.1129 0.1251 0.1066 0.1152 0.1265b2 -0.0046 0.0091 0.0231 -0.0084 0.0050 0.0185 -
0.0934 0.0946 0.0992 0.1190 0.1204 0.1246bF 0.0958 -0.0042 -0.1042 0.1000 0.0000 -0.1000 -
0.0901 0.0901 0.0902 0.1480 0.1480 0.1480
\SUNK 0.0042 0.0042 0.0042 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0132
0.0901 0.0901 0.0902 0.1480 0.1480 0.1480 0.1573
10000 b -0.0005 -0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0007 -0.0005 -
0.0204 0.0158 0.0204 0.0204 0.0238 0.0205b1 -0.0104 -0.0004 0.0097 -0.0101 0.0000 0.0100 -
0.0298 0.0299 0.0309 0.0302 0.0310 0.0312b2 -0.0093 0.0007 0.0108 -0.0098 0.0003 0.0103 -
0.0297 0.0298 0.0300 0.0355 0.0356 0.0358bF 0.0992 -0.0008 -0.1008 0.0998 -0.0002 -0.1002 -
0.0282 0.0282 0.0282 0.0437 0.0437 0.0437
\SUNK 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 -0.0011
0.0282 0.0282 0.0282 0.0437 0.0437 0.0437 0.0454
Table 1: Data generated from equilibrium 1 in Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008).
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Method A Method B N-N
N W 0 0:1 0:2 0 0:1 0:2 -
100 b -0.0675 -0.0691 -0.0704 -0.0667 -0.0660 -0.0684 -
0.2501 0.2523 0.2542 0.2493 0.2477 0.2513b1 -0.2087 -0.1899 -0.1726 -0.1185 -0.1027 -0.0835 -
0.3978 0.4135 0.4286 0.4495 0.4572 0.4718b2 0.3264 0.3447 0.3623 0.1847 0.2025 0.2196 -
0.5430 0.5454 0.5500 0.6563 0.6605 0.6641bF -0.0630 -0.1632 -0.2632 0.0942 -0.0058 -0.1058 -
0.4166 0.4161 0.4159 0.5515 0.5515 0.5515
\SUNK 0.1630 0.1632 0.1632 0.0058 0.0058 0.0058 -0.0455
0.4166 0.4161 0.4159 0.5515 0.5515 0.5515 0.5991
1000 b -0.0296 -0.0302 -0.0314 -0.0318 -0.0306 -0.0304 -
0.1584 0.1600 0.1625 0.1637 0.1603 0.1594b1 -0.0275 -0.0139 0.0003 -0.0096 0.0028 0.0158 -
0.1631 0.1739 0.1872 0.1596 0.1691 0.1807b2 0.0494 0.0626 0.0763 0.0267 0.0394 0.0523 -
0.2108 0.2159 0.2234 0.2047 0.2097 0.2162bF 0.0767 -0.0233 -0.1233 0.1006 0.0006 -0.0994 -
0.1526 0.1526 0.1526 0.1495 0.1495 0.1495
\SUNK 0.0233 0.0233 0.0233 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0052
0.1526 0.1526 0.1526 0.1495 0.1495 0.1495 0.1638
10000 b -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0002 -
0.0093 0.0127 0.0183 0.0130 0.0183 0.0128b1 -0.0147 -0.0046 0.0056 -0.0127 -0.0025 0.0073 -
0.0399 0.0405 0.0425 0.0381 0.0398 0.0387b2 -0.0036 0.0064 0.0166 -0.0063 0.0039 0.0138 -
0.0639 0.0642 0.0649 0.0608 0.0613 0.0610bF 0.0968 -0.0032 -0.1032 0.0995 -0.0005 -0.1005 -
0.0487 0.0487 0.0487 0.0464 0.0464 0.0464
\SUNK 0.0032 0.0032 0.0032 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 -0.0002
0.0487 0.0487 0.0487 0.0464 0.0464 0.0464 0.0508
Table 2: Data generated from equilibrium 2 in Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008).
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Method A Method B N-N
N W 0 0:1 0:2 0 0:1 0:2 -
100 b -0.0649 -0.0641 -0.0658 -0.0695 -0.0649 -0.0663 -
0.2459 0.2427 0.2472 0.2526 0.2450 0.2471b1 -0.2070 -0.1907 -0.1725 -0.1116 -0.0986 -0.0807 -
0.3991 0.4108 0.4261 0.4724 0.4804 0.4920b2 0.3263 0.3420 0.3588 0.1801 0.1961 0.2130 -
0.5460 0.5484 0.5551 0.7092 0.7109 0.7158bF -0.0677 -0.1676 -0.2672 0.0897 -0.0103 -0.1103 -
0.4224 0.4227 0.4230 0.5987 0.5988 0.5988
\SUNK 0.1677 0.1676 0.1672 0.0103 0.0103 0.0103 -0.0370
0.4224 0.4227 0.4230 0.5987 0.5988 0.5988 0.6455
1000 b -0.0320 -0.0322 -0.0333 -0.0326 -0.0324 -0.0319 -
0.1634 0.1643 0.1666 0.1647 0.1648 0.1638b1 -0.0237 -0.0104 0.0041 -0.0060 0.0071 0.0199 -
0.1677 0.1796 0.1932 0.1678 0.1790 0.1900b2 0.0500 0.0633 0.0771 0.0251 0.0383 0.0511 -
0.2130 0.2188 0.2264 0.2174 0.2235 0.2305bF 0.0766 -0.0234 -0.1234 0.1014 0.0014 -0.0986 -
0.1549 0.1550 0.1550 0.1604 0.1604 0.1604
\SUNK 0.0234 0.0234 0.0234 -0.0014 -0.0014 -0.0014 -0.0061
0.1549 0.1550 0.1550 0.1604 0.1604 0.1604 0.1785
10000 b -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0002 -
0.0159 0.0158 0.0156 0.0093 0.0163 0.0128b1 -0.0146 -0.0046 0.0054 -0.0128 -0.0026 0.0073 -
0.0410 0.0414 0.0420 0.0399 0.0415 0.0410b2 -0.0033 0.0067 0.0167 -0.0062 0.0039 0.0138 -
0.0648 0.0649 0.0650 0.0646 0.0650 0.0650bF 0.0965 -0.0035 -0.1035 0.0992 -0.0008 -0.1008 -
0.0496 0.0496 0.0496 0.0497 0.0497 0.0497
\SUNK 0.0035 0.0035 0.0035 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0002
0.0496 0.0496 0.0496 0.0497 0.0497 0.0497 0.0553
Table 3: Data generated from equilibrium 3 in Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008).
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5.2 Empirical Illustration
We estimate a simplied version of an entry-investment game based on the model studied in Ryan
(2012) using his data. In what follows we provide a brief description of the data, highlight the main
di¤erences between the game we model and estimate with that of Ryan (2012). Then we present and
discuss our estimates of the primitives.
Data
We download Ryans data from the Econometrica webpage.6 There are two sets of data. One
contains aggregate prices and quantities for all the US regional markets from the US Geological
Surveys Mineral Yearbook. The other contains the capacities of plants and plant-level information
that Ryan has collected for the Portland cement industry in the United States from 1980 to 1998.
Data on plants includes the name of the rm that owns the plant, the location of the plant, the
number of kilns in the plant and kiln characteristics. Following Ryan we assume that the plant
capacity equals the sum of the capacity of all kilns in the plant and that di¤erent plants are owned
by di¤erent rms. We observe that plantsnames and ownerships change frequently. This can be
due to either mergers and acquisitions or to simple changes in the company name. We do not treat
these changes as entry/exit movements. We check each observation in the sample using the kiln
information (fuel type, process type, year of installation and plant location) installed in the plant. If
a plant changes its name but keeps the same kiln characteristics, we assume that the name change
is not associated to any entry/exit movement. This way of preparing the data enables us to match
most of the summary statistics of plant-level data in Table 2 of Ryan. Any discrepancies most likely
can be attributed to the way we treat the change in plantsnames, which may di¤er to Ryan in a
very small number of cases.
Dynamic Game
Ryan models a dynamic game played between rms that own cement plants in order to measure
the welfare costs of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments (1990 CAAA) on the US Portland cement
industry. The decision for each rm is rst whether to enter (or remain in) the market or exit, and if
it is active in the market then how much to invest or divest. Firms investment decisions is governed
by its capacity level. The rms prot is determined by variable payo¤s from the competition in the
product market with other rms, as well as switching costs from the entry and investment/divestment
decisions. There are two action variables in Ryans model. One is a binary choice for entry and the
6https://www.econometricsociety.org/content/supplement-costs-environmental-regulation-concentrated-industry-
0.
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other is a continuous level of investment. Past actions are the only observed endogenous state
variables in the game. The aggregate data that are used to construct variable prots, through a
static Cournot game with capacity constraints between rms, are treated as exogenous.
We consider a discrete game that extends the single agent model in the paper as described in
the Appendix. The main departure from Ryan (2012) is that we combine the entry decision along
with the capacity level into a single discrete variable. We set the action space to be an ordinal
set f0; 1; 2; 3; 4; 5g, where 0 represents exit/inactive, and the positive integers are ordered to denote
entry/active with di¤erent capacity levels. The payo¤ for each rm has two additive separable
components. One depends on the observables while the other is an unobserved shock. The observable
component can be broken down into variable prots, operating cost and switching costs. We assume
the variable prot is determined by the players competing in a capacity constrained Cournot game.
The operating cost is a xed prot that incurs when ait > 0. The switching costs capture the essence
of rmsentry and investment decisions. Lastly each rm receives unobserved prot shocks for each
action with a standard i.i.d. type-1 extreme value distribution.
Estimation
The period expected payo¤ for each rm as a function of the observables consists of variable
prots, operating costs and switching costs. The variable prot is derived from a capacity constrained
Cournot game constructed from the same demand and cost functions estimated as in Ryans paper.
The operating and switching costs parameters enter the payo¤ function additively and are parameters
to be estimated using the dynamic model. These operating cost is non-zero whenever ait > 0. For
the switching costs we normalize the payo¤ for choosing action 0 to be zero. There are a total of 25
switching cost parameters to be estimated.7
The payo¤ function in our empirical model satises Assumptions MN and MP in the Appendix.
So we estimate the model using Methods A and B as described in Section 5.1. We also test if the
two estimates of the switching costs statistically di¤er. Instead of using nonparametric estimator,
similar to Ryan, we use a multinomial logit to estimate the choice and transition probabilities in
the rst stage. More specically, method A proles out the 26 linear coe¢ cients and uses grid
search to estimate the discount factor. Method B rst estimates the 25 switching cost parameters
in closed-form using the closed-form expression in Section 4, treat them as known, before proling
and performing the grid search. We also estimate the sunk entry and investment values based on the
estimates from Methods A and B, as well as nonparametrically without normalization (cf. Corollaries
7Ryan (2012) models the switching costs di¤erently. The xed operating cost is normalized to be zero. Non-zero
investment and divestment costs are drawn from two distinct independent normal distributions, whose means and
variances are estimated using the methodology in Bajari, Benkard and Levin (2007).
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1 and 2, and see the discussion in the Appendix).
We estimate the standard errors, as well as computing the p-value of the Wald statistics to test
if the switching costs estimators from methods A and B di¤er by bootstrapping. Our bootstrap
sample is generated using the multinomial logit choice and transition probabilities for each player in
each market in the same manner as a parametric bootstrap; cf. Kasahara and Shimotsu (2008) and
Pakes, Ostrovsky and Berry (2007). We use 500 bootstrap samples and report the standard errors
in italics.
Results
We estimate the model twice. Once using the data from before and after the implementation
of the 1990 CAAA. We assume for illustrational purposes the data are generated from di¤erent
equilibria over the two time periods, but the same equilibrium is played in all markets within each
time period and there is no other source of unobserved heterogeneity.8
Table 4 and 5 compile the results from estimating switching costs using the data from the years
1980 to 1990 and 1991 to 1998 respectively. Tables 6 and 7 give the estimates for the discount
factor and xed operating cost using the data from the corresponding periods. Table 8 compares the
estimates of the sunk entry costs and sunk investment costs.
The signs and relative magnitudes of individually estimated switching costs almost uniformly
make sensible economic sense. E.g., by reading down the columns in Tables 4 and 5, we see that
entering at higher capacity level generally implies higher cost (negative payo¤), and increasing the
capacity level should be costly while divestment can return revenue for rms. This is quite an
impressive nding in particular for Method B, which shows that the observed probabilities alone
can generate switching costs estimates that capture reasonably well a key feature of a complicated
structural model. The switching cost estimates from both Methods A and B are similar. The Wald
statistics do not nd the two switching costs estimators to be statistically di¤erent.9 Therefore we
do not reject the capacity constrained Cournot game specication based on comparing the switching
costs estimates. Comparing Tables 4 and 5 shows the entry and switching costs increase after
8Recently Otsu, Pesendorfer and Takahashi (2015) propose several tests to detect di¤erences in the probability
distribution of data across markets. If a test rejects then there is evidence data across markets should not be pooled
together, which can point to possible violation of single equilibrium assumption and/or misspecication in terms of
omitting other unobserved heterogeneity. They actually suggest Ryans data in general should not be pooled together
across markets. In particular there is a strong evidence against pooling data between 1980 and 1990, while the data
from 1991 to 1998 did not get rejected by some of their poolability tests.
9Our test statistic takes a standard quardratic form of the di¤erence between the switching costs estimates from
methods A and B. Its asymptotic distribution under the null hypothesis (of no di¤erence) is a Chi-squared random
variable with 25 degree of freedoms.
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the implementation of 1990 CAAA. Higher entry costs is a key nding in Ryans paper as new
entrants face more stringent regulations than incumbents. An increase in switching costs can be
partly attributed to the new plants using newer (or better maintained) equipment that require more
certication and testing than previously.
We nd the discount factor to be around the range that are usually used (between 0.9 and 0.95)
apart from the estimate using Method B before the 1990 CAAA that appears close to the boundary.10
Although our estimates suggest rms face a lower borrowing rate than in Ryan, we do not reject the
hypothesis that  = 0:9 as assumed in his paper. We also nd a small increase in the xed operating
costs after the implementation of 1990 CAAA.
Finally Table 8 reports sunk costs using di¤erent estimation methods. The estimates from Meth-
ods A and B can be found by computing SCa0!a SCa!a0 using individual switching costs in Tables
4 and 5. The N-N approach estimates the same object without the assumption that the payo¤ is
zero upon choosing action 0. The signs and magnitudes of the sunk cost estimates are plausible. We
nd the sunk investment costs between any two capacity levels increase as the gap between levels
grow, while we nd the costs to be of similar magnitude when compared within the same capacity
di¤erence bands. We also nd the sunk costs to have increased after the implementation of 1990
CAAA.
10The innite time expected discounted payo¤s with respect to each action is unbounded with  = 1. However, the
di¤erences between diverge very slowly when we approximate them with a Neumann sum, and the objective function
appears to be well-dened numerically even as  is very close to 1.
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Method A
ait 1 = 0 ait 1 = 1 ait 1 = 2 ait 1 = 3 ait 1 = 4 ait 1 = 5
ait = 1 -3.300 - 2.265 5.080 7.956 10.770
0.985 - 0.680 0.707 0.766 0.929
ait = 2 -10.502 -5.243 - 5.528 10.609 15.810
0.937 0.719 - 0.887 0.998 1.117
ait = 3 -23.266 -15.439 -7.624 - 7.996 16.050
1.405 1.010 0.683 - 0.923 1.237
ait = 4 -41.023 -30.620 -20.196 -9.808 - 11.648
2.003 1.850 1.430 1.094 - 1.442
ait = 5 -52.879 -50.648 -39.027 -25.756 -11.949 -
2.281 2.585 2.041 1.395 1.537 -
Method B
ait 1 = 0 ait 1 = 1 ait 1 = 2 ait 1 = 3 ait 1 = 4 ait 1 = 5
ait = 1 -2.776 - 2.540 5.333 8.014 11.696
0.269 - 0.333 0.567 0.967 1.113
ait = 2 -10.483 -5.197 - 5.243 10.466 15.893
0.689 0.365 - 0.368 0.718 1.110
ait = 3 -23.279 -15.427 -7.769 - 7.732 16.134
1.339 0.920 0.474 - 0.640 1.006
ait = 4 -41.422 -31.007 -20.797 -10.416 - 10.852
1.808 1.594 1.078 0.682 - 0.864
ait = 5 -54.378 -52.892 -41.874 -28.792 -16.091 -
1.911 2.232 1.844 1.659 1.835 -
Specication Test
Statistic 14.069
p-value 0.961
Table 4: Results from estimating switching costs using data from the years 1980 to 1990.
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Method A
ait 1 = 0 ait 1 = 1 ait 1 = 2 ait 1 = 3 ait 1 = 4 ait 1 = 5
ait = 1 -6.962 - 4.449 9.881 15.125 20.264
1.530 - 1.514 1.501 1.689 1.634
ait = 2 -17.038 -8.291 - 9.872 18.531 26.722
1.723 1.364 - 1.714 1.860 1.527
ait = 3 -35.489 -23.412 -11.411 - 12.961 24.283
2.444 1.866 1.371 - 1.955 1.614
ait = 4 -51.544 -50.043 -33.220 -16.363 - 16.524
3.061 3.419 3.278 2.825 - 3.561
ait = 5 -64.018 -63.994 -61.481 -48.514 -24.374
4.514 4.524 4.502 3.683 2.056
Method B
ait 1 = 0 ait 1 = 1 ait 1 = 2 ait 1 = 3 ait 1 = 4 ait 1 = 5
ait = 1 -5.653 - 5.294 10.730 16.264 21.567
0.726 - 0.704 1.109 1.703 1.378
ait = 2 -17.746 -9.278 - 8.774 17.461 25.754
1.379 0.780 - 0.857 1.364 1.218
ait = 3 -36.098 -24.537 -11.950 - 11.862 23.489
2.282 1.767 1.128 - 1.221 1.401
ait = 4 -51.840 -50.425 -33.468 -16.760 - 16.753
2.202 2.649 2.397 1.904 - 2.025
ait = 5 -64.236 -64.355 -61.706 -48.272 -24.093
6.712 6.771 6.713 5.695 3.389
Specication Test
Statistic 13.196
p-value 0.975
Table 5: Results from estimating switching costs using data from the years 1991 to 1998.
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Method A
Discount Factor Operating Cost
0.956 -1.679
0.084 0.489
Method B
Discount Factor Operating Cost
0.999 -1.523
0.075 0.649
Table 6: Results from estimating the discount factor and xed operating cost using data from the
years 1980 to 1990.
Method A
Discount Factor Operating Cost
0.938 -2.079
0.162 1.10
Method B
Discount Factor Operating Cost
0.946 -1.893
0.160 0.948
Table 7: Results from estimating the discount factor and xed operating cost using data from the
years 1991 to 1998.
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Before After
ait ait 1 Method A Method B N-N Method A Method B N-N
1 0 3.30 2.78 2.78 6.96 5.65 5.66
0.36 0.27 0.27 1.53 0.73 0.70
2 0 10.50 10.48 10.48 17.04 17.75 17.74
0.94 0.69 0.69 1.72 1.38 1.49
3 0 23.27 23.28 23.28 35.49 36.10 36.10
1.41 1.34 1.34 2.44 2.28 2.18
4 0 41.02 41.42 41.42 51.54 51.84 51.83
2.00 1.81 1.80 3.06 2.20 1.61
5 0 52.88 54.38 54.25 64.02 64.24 64.22
2.28 1.91 2.00 4.51 6.71 6.34
2 1 2.98 2.66 2.44 3.84 3.98 3.30
1.22 2.54 0.25 0.31 0.61 0.36
3 2 2.10 2.53 2.56 1.54 3.18 3.22
1.18 2.30 0.26 0.30 0.73 0.33
4 3 1.81 2.68 2.58 3.40 4.90 4.81
1.52 4.33 0.28 0.42 2.45 0.50
5 4 0.30 5.24 2.87 7.85 7.34 7.30
2.50 4.75 0.33 1.74 4.58 2.14
3 1 10.36 10.09 10.01 13.53 13.81 13.05
1.22 2.12 0.75 0.79 1.24 0.98
4 2 9.59 10.33 10.29 14.69 16.01 16.07
1.54 3.31 0.77 0.81 2.13 1.25
5 3 9.71 12.66 10.91 24.23 24.78 24.21
1.45 4.83 0.91 1.37 6.09 5.22
4 1 22.66 22.99 22.76 34.92 34.16 34.02
1.78 3.29 1.37 1.45 1.93 1.42
5 2 23.22 25.98 24.05 34.76 35.95 34.79
1.83 4.64 1.79 1.59 6.89 6.34
5 1 39.88 41.20 40.21 43.73 42.79 41.67
2.40 4.68 2.60 2.08 6.82 6.40
Table 8: Results from estimating the sunk entry and investment costs.
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6 Concluding Remarks
We show the discount factor can be identied jointly with the payo¤ function under the linear-in-
parameter specication. The key property we exploit is the conditional linearity of the choice-specic
value functions for a given value of the discount factor. The discount factor can in fact be identied
even if the payo¤ parameters cannot be identied. This has an important implication since many
empirical problems have to normalize parts of the payo¤ parameters. Our result shows the discount
factor can be identied independently of these normalization choices.
We also contribute to recent interest in the robust identication of combination of switching costs
without any normalization as studied in Aguirregabiria and Suzuki (2014); also see Kalouptsidi, Scott
and Souza-Rodrigues (2016a, 2016b). We provide closed-form identication results independently of
the discount factor and other parts of the payo¤ function. We show some costs, such as sunk entry
and investment costs, can be identied without any normalization and, for linear models, even when
an incorrect normalization is used.
We have shown our parametric and nonparametric identication approaches can deliver substan-
tially di¤erent (avors of) results. But there is a considerable overlap in practice when it comes to
estimating the switching costs as a payo¤ function can satisfy both P and N(i). However, there are
notable implications for our nonparametric results that extend beyond the linear model. First, a re-
searcher may want to use a nonlinear parametric specication on parts of the payo¤s; for example to
impose positivity. Second, our nonparametric identication result is valid pointwise for each observed
state, therefore it is immediately applicable to models with continuous states; e.g. see Srisuma and
Linton (2012). In these cases Assumption P has no implication on our nonparametric identication
results.
Finally our main message is that one should generally attempt to identify and estimate the
discount factor in dynamic decision problems and games. Clearly we do not expect the linear speci-
cation to be necessary for identication, but an analysis with nonlinear a parametric payo¤ function
will be substantially more di¢ cult. Similarly, outside of discrete choice models, e.g. for games with
supermodular payo¤ functions (see Bajari, Benkard and Levin (2007) and Srisuma (2013)), joint
identication and estimation of the discount factor and payo¤ parameters should also be possible.
However, the practical implementation can be burdensome since there is no obvious way to reduce
the parameter space even when the payo¤ functions take a linear-in-parameter structure.
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Appendix
The Appendix has two parts. A.1 extends the results on identication of switching costs to dynamic
games. A.2 provides a high level su¢ cient condition for the identication of the discount factor.
Since the single agent decision problem is a special case of a game, we also present the results in A.2
in the context of a game.
A.1 Identication of the Switching Costs in Dynamic Games
We shall keep our description of the basic elements of the game very brief. The notation we use
directly extends what we describe in Sections 2 and 3. Consider a game with I players, indexed
by i 2 I = f1; : : : ; Ig. The random variables in the game are the actions: at  (ait; a it) 2 AI ,
A = f0; 1; : : : ; Jg; past actions wt  (wit; w it) 2 AI ; sit  (wt; xt; "it) 2 AI  X  RJ+1, where
X = f1; : : : ; Kg, and "it  ("it (0) ; : : : ; "it (J)) 2 RJ+1; and we let st  (wt; xt; "1t; : : : ; "It).
In an equilibrium ait = i (sit) for all i, such that
i (si) = max
ai2A
fE[ui (ait; a it; si) jsit = si; ait = ai] + E [Vi (sit+1) jsit = si; ait = ai]g; (18)
where ui and Vi are player is payo¤ and value function respectively; in particular
Vi (si) =
1X
t=0
tE [ui (ait; a it; sit) jsi0 = si] :
Assumption MN updates Assumptions M and N for games.
Assumption MN:
(i) (Additive Separability) For all ai; a i; w; x; "i:
ui (ai; a i; w; x; "i) = i (ai; a i; w; x) + "i (ai) :
(ii) (Conditional Independence I) The transition distribution of the states has the following fac-
torization for all x0; "0; x; "; a:
P (x0; "0jx; "; w; a) =
IY
i=1
Qi ("
0
i)G (x
0jx;w; a) ;
where Qi is the cumulative distribution function of "it and G denotes the transition law of xt+1
conditioning on xt; at. Furthermore, "it has nite rst moments, and a positive, continuous and
bounded density on RJ+1.
(iii) (Finite Observed State) X = f1; : : : ; Kg.
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(iv) (Decomposition of Prots): For all a; w; x:
i (ai; a i; w; x; ") = i (ai; a i; x) + i (ai   wi; w i; x) ;
such that i (0; w i; x) = 0.
(v) (Conditional Independence II): The distribution of xt+1 conditional on at and xt is indepen-
dent of wt.
Beside from explicitly separating out past actions from other observed state variables, MN(i) to
MN(iii) are standard in the dynamic discrete choice game literature; e.g. see Aguirregabiria and
Mira (2007), Bajari et al. (2007), Pakes and Berry (2007), and Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler
(2008). MN(iv) extends N(i). It assumes that strategic interactions can a¤ect payo¤s in i directly
but not i, while past actions enter i but not i. The exclusion restrictions we impose are quite
natural for components of i such as per-period variable prots and operation costs, while switching
costs that occur for each player are determined by her own actions. It will be useful to sometimes
represent the switching cost using a more intuitive notation (cf. equation (9)):
i (ai   wi; w i; x) = SCwi!aii (w i; x) :
MN(v) is a direct extension of N(ii).
As with the single agent case, our identication study will be based on the choice-specic value
function:
vi (ai; w; x) = E [i (ai; a it; wt; x) jwt = w; xt = x] + E [Vi (st+1) jwt = w; xt = x; at = a] ;
which can be recover from:
Pr [ait = aijwt = w; xt = x] = Pr [vi (ai; w; x) vi (a0i; w; x) > "it (a0i)  "it (ai) for all a0i 6= ai] ;
wherevi (ai; w; x)  vi (ai; w; x) vi (0; w; x). Let also, i (ai; a i; x)  i (ai; a i; x) i (0; a i; x)
and i (ai; w; x)  i (ai   wi; w i; x)  i ( wi; w i; x). Lemma 4 is a generalization of Lemma 1.
Lemma 4: Under Assumption MN, we have for all i; ai > 0 and w; x:
vi (ai; w; x) = E [i (ai; a it; x) jwt = w; xt = x] + i (ai; w; x) ;
where,
i (ai; a i; x)  i (ai; a i; x)  i (0; a i; x) +  (emi (ai; a i; x)  emi (0; a i; x)) ;emi (ai; a i; x)  E [mi (wt+1; xt+1) jait = ai; a it = a i; xt = x] ;
mi (w; x)  E [Vi (sit) jwt = w; xt = x] :
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Proof: Follows immediately from applying the law of iterated expectations (cf. the proof of
Lemma 1).
Since we have nite actions and states, we can collect vi (ai; w; x) across w for each (i; ai; x)
into a vector of size (J + 1)I . Using a matrix form, we have:
vi (ai; x) = Zi (x) i (ai; x) + Qi (ai; x)i (ai; x) ; (19)
wherevi (ai; x) = (vi (ai; w; x))w2AI , i (ai; x) = (i (ai; a i; x))a i2AI 1 , Zi (x) represents the
matrix of conditional probabilities for computing a conditional expectation of a it given (wt = w; xt = x),
Qi (ai; x)i (ai; x) represents (i (ai; w; x))a2AI with i (ai; x) = (i (ai   wi; w i; x))wi2A;w i2AI 1
and Qi (ai; x) is a matrix of indicators (consisting of 0s and 1s) that pick up switching costs as
appropriate.
Theorem 3 generalizes the closed-form identication of switching costs in Theorem 1 for dynamic
games.
Theorem 3: Assume that Assumption MN holds. Let D be an `1  (J + 1)I matrix with
(D) = `1 such that (J + 1)
I 1 < `1  (J + 1)I . Denote DZi (x) by eZ and (eZ) by `2. Suppose
also DQi (ai; x)i = eQe+0 for some `3 dimensional vectors e and 0 that consist of elements,
possibly combinations, of i such that `3  `1   `2, and eQ is an `1  `3 matrix with (eQ) = `3. If
([eZ : eQ]) = `2 + `3 then,
e = (eQ>ePeQ) 1 eQ>eP (Dvi (ai; x)  0) : (20)
where eP = I`1   eZ(eZ>eZ)yeZ>.
Before presenting the proof to Theorem 3 some explanations on the notations will be useful.
The crucial interpretation of our result rests on the relation: DQi (ai; x)i = eQe + 0. The goal
of Theorem 3 is to identify components, or combinations, of (i (ai; w; x))w2AI using choice-specic
value functions in equation (19) for a given (i; ai; x). We denote the object of interest by e. We use
0 to account for components of switching costs that can be identied outside the dynamic model
from the data or by normalization. Therefore (D; eQ) are user-chosen matrices and are known. We
can also treat eZi as known since Zi (x) is a matrix of observed choice probabilities.
Proof of Theorem 3.
Note that `3  1 since `2  minf`1; (Zi (x))g and (Zi (x))  (J + 1)I 1. Multiply equation
(19) by D yields,
Dvi (ai; x) = eZi (ai; x) + eQe+ 0:
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By assumption, ePeQ has full column rank. The result then follows from projecting vi (ai; x) or-
thogonally onto the null space of eZ and solve out for ei.
One systematic approach to apply Theorem 3 in practice is to rst write out the matrix equation
(19). Then choose D so that DQi (ai; x)i contains the switching costs of interest, and deneeQe + 0 appropriately. We now illustrate this identifying strategy with a two-player binary choice
game for di¤erent types of switching costs.
For notational compactness we will suppress xt and assume that SCw!ai (w i) is the same for
all w i. We use i (wi; w i)  vi (1; wi; w i)   vi (0; wi; w i), p i (w)  Pr [a it = 1jwt = w], and
i (a i)  i (1; a i). Then equation (19) represents:266664
vi (0; 0)
vi (0; 1)
vi (1; 0)
vi (1; 1)
377775 =
266664
1  p i (0; 0)
1  p i (0; 1)
1  p i (1; 0)
1  p i (1; 1)
p i (0; 0)
p i (0; 1)
p i (1; 0)
p i (1; 1)
377775
"
i (0)
i (1)
#
+
266664
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
377775
"
SC0!1i
 SC1!0i
#
: (21)
In particular we have
Qi (ai; x)i =
266664
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
377775
"
SC0!1i
 SC1!0i
#
:
We consider three examples of potential objects of interest.
Example 1: Sunk entry cost
Suppose we want to identify  SC0!1i  SC1!0i that represents the sunk entry cost in the context
of an entry game. We can subtract vi (0; 0) from the rst equation in (21) o¤ the remaining three
equations. This yields2664
vi (0; 1)
vi (1; 0)
vi (1; 1)
3775 =
2664
p i (0; 0)  p i (0; 1)
p i (0; 0)  p i (1; 0)
p i (0; 0)  p i (1; 1)
p i (0; 1)  p i (0; 0)
p i (1; 0)  p i (0; 0)
p i (1; 1)  p i (0; 0)
3775
"
i (0)
i (1)
#
+
2664
0
1
1
3775  SC0!1i   SC1!0i  :
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In particular, in this case,
eZ =
2664
p i (0; 0)  p i (0; 1)
p i (0; 0)  p i (1; 0)
p i (0; 0)  p i (1; 1)
p i (0; 1)  p i (0; 0)
p i (1; 0)  p i (0; 0)
p i (1; 1)  p i (0; 0)
3775 ;
D =
2664
 1 1 0 0
 1 0 1 0
 1 0 0 1
3775 ; eQ =
2664
0
1
1
3775 ; e =  SC0!1i   SC1!0i , and 0 = 0:
The sunk entry cost can then be identied by the expression in equation (20).
Example 2: Menu cost under symmetry
Suppose we want to identify SC0!1i under the assumption that SC
0!1
i = SC
1!0
i . Then equation
(21) becomes266664
vi (0; 0)
vi (0; 1)
vi (1; 0)
vi (1; 1)
377775 =
266664
1  p i (0; 0)
1  p i (0; 1)
1  p i (1; 0)
1  p i (1; 1)
p i (0; 0)
p i (0; 1)
p i (1; 0)
p i (1; 1)
377775
"
i (0)
i (1)
#
+
266664
1
1
 1
 1
377775 SC0!1i  :
In this case
eZ =
266664
1  p i (0; 0)
1  p i (0; 1)
1  p i (1; 0)
1  p i (1; 1)
p i (0; 0)
p i (0; 1)
p i (1; 0)
p i (1; 1)
377775 ;D = I4; eQ =
266664
1
1
 1
 1
377775 ; e = SC0!1i , and 0 = 0:
Example 3: Switching Costs with Normalizations
Suppose we want to identify SC0!1i under the assumption that SC
0!1
i = c0. For example, we
may be interested in identifying the entry cost under the assumption that the scrap value is c0. Then
equation (21) becomes266664
vi (0; 0)
vi (0; 1)
vi (1; 0)
vi (1; 1)
377775 =
266664
1  p i (0; 0)
1  p i (0; 1)
1  p i (1; 0)
1  p i (1; 1)
p i (0; 0)
p i (0; 1)
p i (1; 0)
p i (1; 1)
377775
"
i (0)
i (1)
#
+
266664
1
1
0
0
377775 SC0!1i +
266664
0
0
 c0
 c0
377775 :
In this case
eZ =
266664
1  p i (0; 0)
1  p i (0; 1)
1  p i (1; 0)
1  p i (1; 1)
p i (0; 0)
p i (0; 1)
p i (1; 0)
p i (1; 1)
377775 ;D = I4; eQ =
266664
1
1
0
0
377775 ; e = SC0!1i , and 0 =
266664
0
0
 c0
 c0
377775 :
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In order to obtain the sunk costs when the number of actions is larger than two one has to combine
identiable objects across actions, e.g. see Corollary 2. Identication of objects for each action can
be obtained as the examples above have shown. We use Theorem 3 to estimate the games such as
those in our simulation study and the empirical model of capacity game in Section 5 of our paper.
A.2 A Su¢ cient Condition for Identication of the Discount Factor
In this part of the appendix we attempt to give a more analytical approach that ensures identication
of the discount factor and payo¤ parameters in a dynamic game context. We rst introduce some
additional notations.
For any x = (x1; : : : ; xp)
> 2 Rp and y = (y1; : : : ; yp+1)> 2 Rp+1, let kxk1 = maxi=1;:::;p jxij and
kyk2 = maxi=1;:::;p jyij + jyp+1j. Then for a class of p + 1 by p real matrices, we denote the matrix
norms induced by
 kk1 ; kk2 by kk1;2 . We comment that these are not standard induced matrix
norms, however they have simple explicit bounds. In particular it is easy to verify that, for any matrix
p+ 1 by p, C = (cij),
kCk1;2  maxi=1;:::;p
pX
j=1
jcijj+
pX
j=1
jcp+1;jj :
We also need the parameter space to be compact. Let    2  : maxi=1;:::;p jij  k	 and B 
0; b

for some positive k and b 2 (0; 1).
Next we generalize the setup of Section 4 to dynamic games. The following is a straightforward
extension of Assumptions M and P.
Assumption MP:
(i) (Additive Separability) For all ai; a i; x; "i:
ui (ai; a i; x; "i; ) = i (ai; a i; x; ) + "i (ai) :
(ii) (Conditional Independence I) The transition distribution of the states has the following fac-
torization for all x0; "0; x; "; a:
P (x0; "0jx; "; w; a) =
IY
i=1
Qi ("
0
i)G (x
0jx;w; a) ;
where Qi is the cumulative distribution function of "it and G denotes the transition law of xt+1
conditioning on xt; at. Furthermore, "it has nite rst moments, and a positive, continuous and
bounded density on RJ+1.
(iii) (Finite Observed State) X = f1; : : : ; Kg.
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(iv) (Linear-in-Parameters): For all ai; a i; x; "i:
i (ai; a i; x; ) = i0 (ai; a i; x) + 
>i1 (ai; a i; x) ;
where i0 is a known real value function, i1 is a known p dimensional vector value function and 
belongs to Rp.
Our analysis will be based on the parameterized choice-specic value function:
vi (ai; x; ; ) = E [i (ai; a it; x; ) jxt = x] + E [Vi (st+1; ; ) jxt = x; ait = ai] ; where
Vi (si; ; ) =
1X
t=0
tE [ui (ait; a it; sit; ) jsi0 = si] :
Let vi (ai; x; ; )  vi (ai; x; ; )   vi (0; x; ; ). We can use vi from all players to dene the
pseudo-model and the corresponding notion of identication and observationally equivalence as in
Section 4. We will omit this discussion to avoid repetition.
Our starting point will be the following lemma that generalizes Lemma 2.
Lemma 5: Under Assumption MP, we have for all i; ai > 0, v
ai
i (; )  (vi (ai; x; ; ))x2X
can collected in the following vector form for all (; ) 2 B :
vaii (; ) = R
ai
i0 + H
ai
i (IK   L) 1 Ri0 (22)
+
 
Raii1 + H
ai
i (IK   L) 1 Ri1


+Haii (IK   L) 1 i;
where the elements in the above display are collected and explained in Tables C and D.
Matrix Dimension Representing
Raii1 K by p E [i1 (ai; a it; xt)  i1 (0; a it; xt) jxt = ]
R1 K by p E [i1 (at; xt) jxt = ]
L K by K E[ (xt+1) jxt = ]
Haii K by K E[ (xt+1) jxt = ; ait = ai]
Haii K by K E[ (xt+1) jxt = ; ait = ai]  E[ (xt+1) jxt = ; ait = 0]
Table C. The matrices consist of (di¤erences in) expected payo¤s and probabilities. The latter
represent conditional expectations for any function  of xt+1.
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Vector Representing
i E ["it (ait)jxt = ]
Raii0 E [i0 (ai; a it; xt)  i0 (0; a it; xt) jxt = ]
Ri0 E [i0 (at; xt) jxt = ]
(IK   iL) 1 Rij
P1
t=0 
tE[ij (at; xt) jx0 = ]
Haii (IK   iL) 1 Rij
P1
t=0 
t (E[ij (at; xt) jai0 = ai; x0 = ]  E[ij (at; xt) jai0 = 0; x0 = ])
Haii (IK   iL) 1 i
P1
t=0 
t (E ["t (at)j ai0 = ai; x0 = ]  E ["t (at)j ai0 = 0; x0 = ])
Table D. The K by 1 vectors represent (di¤erences in) expected payo¤s.
Our strategy to show identication is to re-write Lemma 5 to set up a map that denes the data
generating parameter as its xed-point. One desired relation is the following.
Lemma 6: Under Assumption MP, (; ) is observationally equivalent to (0; 0) if and only if
(; ) satises
caii  Daii ()    Ei () = Faii
 


!
(23)
for all i; ai > 0, where
caii = v
ai
i (0; 0) Raii0 ;
Daii () = H
ai
i (IK   L) 1 Ri1;
Ei () = 
2Haii L (IK   L) 1 (Ri0 + i) ;
Faii = [R
ai
i1 : H
ai
i (Ri0+i)] :
Proof: Equation (23) is obtained by re-arranging equation (22), after applying the identity
that (IK   L) 1 = IK + L (IK   L) 1 and replace vaii (; ) by vaii (0; 0). Therefore, by
construction, (; ) satises (22) if and only if it is observationally equivalent to (0; 0).
The following result provides one condition that is su¢ cient for the identication of (0; 0).
Theorem 4: Assume that K  p+ 1 and Assumption MP holds. Suppose there exists i; ai such
that: (i) the rank of Faii is p + 1; (ii) there exists a p + 1 by K matrix A0 such that A0F
ai
i is
non-singular; and (iii) max fg1;g2g < 1, where
g1 = max
2B
(A0Faii ) 1 A0Haii  (IK   L) 1 R1i1;2 ;
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g2 = max
;02B;2
(A0Faii ) 1 A0Haii
 
(IK   L) 1 (IK   0L) 1 R1i
+L (IK   L) 1 (( + 0) IK   0L) (IK   0L) 1 (R0i + i)
!
1;2
:
Then (0; 0) is identiable.
Proof: First dene Qaii : [0; 1]k ! Rp+1 as follows:
Qaii (; ) = (A0Faii ) 1 A0caii   (A0Faii ) 1 A0Daii ()    (A0Faii ) 1 A0Ei () :
By construction, from (23), it is easy to see that (0; 0) is a xed-point ofQ. Take any (; ) ; (0; 0) 2
B , then
Qaii (; ) Qaii (0; 0) =   (A0Faii ) 1 A0 (Daii ()   Daii (0) 0 + Ei ()  Ei (0)) ;
where
Daii ()   Daii (0) 0 = Haii

 (IK   L) 1 Ri1   0 (IK   0L) 1 Ri10

= Haii
 
(   0) (IK   L) 1 (IK   0L) 1 Ri1
+0 (IK   0L) 1 Ri1 (   0)
!
;
and
Ei ()  Ei (0) = Haii L

2 (IK   L) 1   02 (IK   0L) 1

(Ri0 + i)
= Haii L

(   0) (IK   L) 1 (( + 0) IK   0L) (IK   0L) 1

(Ri0 + i) ;
which can be shown by making use of the following identities:
 (IK   L) 1   0 (IK   0L) 1 = (   0) (IK   L) 1 (IK   0L) 1 ;
2 (IK   L) 1   02 (IK   0L) 1 = (   0) (IK   L) 1 (( + 0) IK   0L) (IK   0L) 1 :
It then follows that
jQaii (; ) Qaii (0; 0)j  g1 k   0k1 + g2 j   0j
 max fg1;g2g

 


!
 
 
0
0
!
2
:
I.e. Qaii is a contraction, hence it has a unique xed point. Now suppose (0; 0) is not identiable.
Then there exists some (; ) 6= (0; 0) that is observationally equivalent to (0; 0). By an impli-
cation of Lemma 6 (; ) must also be a xed point of Qaii , which is a contradiction. Thus (0; 0)
is identiable.
Comments on Theorem 4:
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(i) Compact Domain. B cannot include 1 as the expected discounted returns would then be
unbounded. Compactness is useful for showing existence of a xed point. There is also a trade-o¤ in
the choice of b and k in the denitions of B and  respectively. For example, smaller b and k means
smaller max fg1;g2g but this is a restriction on the parameter space.
(ii) Choice of A0. The need to select A0 can be eliminated altogether by removing some rows
in (23) so that we have exactly p + 1 equations. In fact it is not necessary to take equations that
only correspond to the states from a particular player i and ai. Since the parametric structure in
(23) is the same for all states we can select any p+ 1 equations from any i and ai and compute the
corresponding matrix norms for g1 and g2. This gives us di¤erent combinations of equations we can
use, and we only need the analog of max fg1;g2g to be less than 1 for one of them to ensure (0; 0)
is identiable.
(iii) Rank Deciency. We have seen that sometimes not all components of the payo¤ functions
can be identied. For example in the entry/exit game generally the entry cost and scrap value
cannot be jointly identied. Then one may consider normalizing, say, the scrap value in order to
estimate all the other parameters in the model. If the normalized value is incorrect one may expect
that identication of the parameters of interest will not be possible since the model is misspecied.
Yet, our simulation study suggests the discount factor can be consistently estimated while all other
prot parameters are biased when an incorrect scrap value is assumed. We can also relax condition
(i) in Theorem 4 in this direction and allow Faii to be rank decient. In particular, recall from
(23) that Faii = [R
ai
i1 : H
ai
i (Ri0+i)], we can allow R
ai
i1 to be rank decient. In such case there
exists a full rank matrix W such that Raii1W = [eRaii1 : 0] where eRaii1 has full column rank;
e.g. this is a consequence of Theorem 6.2.4 in Mirsky (1955). Then Faii
 


!
in (23) becomes
h
eRaii1 : 0 : Haii (Ri0+i)i
 
W 1

!
. Therefore, by inspection, the proof of Theorem 4 can be
readily adapted by reparameterizing  to show the identication of the discount factor is possible.
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